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MODERATOR’S REPORT
Legal Experts’ Workshop on the Future Global Legal Order
Craig H. Allen
In late 2006, as part of its multifaceted effort to help the Chief of Naval Opera-tions develop a new, contemporary maritime strategy for the nation, the Naval
War College convened a “Delphi group” of experts—in this case, in inter-
national law—to provide the maritime strategy development team a candid as-
sessment of the probable state of the global legal order in 2020. The workshop,
chaired by Craig H. Allen, the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International
Law, was held 31 October–1 November 2006 in the College’s Decision Support
Center (equipped with an advanced World Wide Web–based group collabora-
tion and decision-support system), in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.
In addition to four faculty members of the College’s International Law De-
partment, thirty-eight outside experts participated, drawn from the United
States and ten other nations. (The list of participants is available on the Naval
War College Press website.) The group included military and coast guard legal
advisers; attorneys from the Defense, State, Justice, and Homeland Security De-
partments and from the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia; law
professors; an attorney specializing in commercial maritime law; and the direc-
tor of the United Nations Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea.
The experts participated in their personal capaci-
ties, on the understanding that no views would be at-
tributed to any nation, agency, or individual. They
were provided advance copies of the questions that
would be asked and six “strawman” legal futures that
would be considered during the workshop. They were
also given a list of materials that might provide helpful
Professor Allen, of the University of Washington
School of Law (where he is Judson Falknor Professor of
Law), was the Charles H. Stockton Chair in Interna-
tional Law at the Naval War College for 2006–2007.
He chaired the NWC Legal Experts’ Workshop discussed
in this article.
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background: the Chief of Naval Operations/Commandant of the Marine Corps,
Naval Operational Concept (2006); National Intelligence Council, Mapping the
Global Future (2004); Center for Strategic and International Studies, Seven Rev-
olutions (2006); Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Project on National Security, Forging a World of Liberty
under Law (2006); and the UN secretary-general’s high-level panel report A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004).
RELEVANT CHANGES IN THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER
Most organizations assume that the world in front of us is basically
continuous—that tomorrow will be like today. . . . On the contrary, we
live in a time of perpetual discontinuity, a time in which bombshells
and shockers are part of everyday life.
PETER SCHWARTZ
The legal experts’ workshop began with a presentation of the principal law-
related findings of the 24–25 August 2006 Geo-Strategic Environment Workshop
(GSEW) held at the Naval War College. The GSEW findings were summarized in
a “geostrategic grid” comprising six analytic dimensions: economic, energy, en-
vironment, governance, technology, security/law, and demographics. The
GSEW analysis of the governance and security and law dimensions revealed sig-
nificant concern about the vitality of international law and institutions. For ex-
ample, the GSEW concluded that “some international organizations are looking
long in the tooth and incapable of coping with emerging challenges.” Another
expressed concern over the fact that “bilateral agreements are on the rise as
international organizations continue to fall short in their objectives.” Those
concerns and others raised a number of questions that warranted closer exami-
nation by legal experts.
The experts considered, without formally adopting, several propositions as
possible starting points for the workshop. They included the propositions that:
• A robust and respected global legal order, founded on respect for the rule
of law, would save lives by providing predictability, preventing conflicts,
and providing effective and peaceful means to resolve conflicts that do arise.
• Military operations that conflict with international law are more likely to
fail in achieving the desired end state.
• Any maritime strategy must be adapted to the global legal order in which it
will function.
• The future global legal order is uncertain but can be estimated.
• The future global legal order can to some degree be shaped.
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Following the scenario-based planning approach advocated by, among oth-
ers, Peter Schwartz (author of The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in
an Uncertain World) and former National Security Council planner Philip
Bobbitt (now law professor at the University of Texas), the experts considered
six possible future global legal order scenarios for 2020. The first three focused
on the degree and direction of change in the legal order (from significant growth
to regression), one posited a shift from globalism to regionalism, and a fifth
posed the possibility of a collapse of the global legal order. A sixth scenario pos-
ited a dynamic global legal order that defied the foregoing, essentially linear ap-
proach. The suggested characteristics of this sixth future scenario included:
• There would be no single future global legal order—the global legal order
of 2020 would be multifaceted.
• International relations, international law, and international institutions
would be in a constant state of flux, as they would have to be in order to
adapt.
• The roles of international law and institutions would wax and wane in
response to changes in leadership (international, national, and non-
governmental); their effectiveness in responding to crises, chronic
problems, human rights abuses, and demands for reform; the state of the
economy; and perceptions of key stakeholders.
The Baseline
The experts ultimately chose an approach that looked at the likely changes from
the existing “baseline” global legal order. Although they were not asked to define
the baseline, they reviewed some broad parameters before turning to the
changes. Among the baseline considerations discussed (but not resolved or
voted on) was that any discussion of the global legal order must include not only
the obvious treaties, customary international law, and Security Council resolu-
tions but also the transnational application of national laws, decisions of inter-
national tribunals (courts and arbitral tribunals), and “soft law.” In some
Muslim states the Sharia also plays an important, even preeminent, role. Second,
these laws may come into conflict with each other or otherwise create uncertain-
ties. One uncertainty singled out for discussion was the relationship of Security
Council resolutions to existing international law, such as the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Third, U.S. planners must appreciate the impor-
tant role of international law and institutions in perceptions regarding the legit-
imacy of state action. Legitimacy perceptions will be critical in the increasingly
difficult task of building coalitions. A fourth baseline consideration was that the
United States must understand that not all states implement and enforce laws in
A L L E N 7 5
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the maritime domain in the same way. Foreign navies and coast guards may play
roles quite different from their American counterparts, particularly in the area
of law enforcement.
Governance Issues
The legal experts were only slightly more optimistic about international organi-
zations and national institutions than were the GSEW experts. Seventy-eight
percent agreed with the latter that some international organizations are “long in
the tooth” and incapable of coping with emerging challenges. A majority also
agreed that as international organizations and global treaties fall short, more
states will rely on bilateral approaches. They almost universally (92 percent)
agreed that the effective power of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will
grow significantly between now and 2010. When later asked if it is likely that fu-
ture maritime security operations will require the U.S. Navy to coordinate with
NGOs more often, 38 percent believed they would. One expert believed that
there would be much more pre-response engagement with NGOs.
The experts overwhelmingly (72 percent) listed the United Nations Security
Council as the most influential international organization in global affairs; the
European Union (EU) was a distant second at 45 percent, followed by the Group
of Eight (G-8)* at 40 percent. There was less agreement on the future course of
the Security Council.
A majority of the experts predicted that the UN Charter would be amended
to expand the veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council be-
yond the present five. Those who predicted an increase foresaw up to twenty per-
manent members, though most put the number at from seven to ten. One expert
reminded the group that before it would be legally binding on the United States
any amendment would have to receive the advice and consent of two-thirds of
the Senate, leading to the possibility that much of the world might ratify a
change to the Charter that the United States rejected.
All of the experts believed that it is likely (62 percent) or very likely (38 per-
cent) that the Security Council will pass more “legislative” resolutions in the
coming years—as it has done with respect to international terrorism, in UN Se-
curity Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373, and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), in UNSCR 1540. A slight majority believed that the Secu-
rity Council would eventually impose upon Iran proliferation-related sanctions
that could require maritime enforcement (which it later did, in UNSCR 1747).
That might have significant consequences for the U.S. Navy and its partners in
the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean. More generally, however, 83 percent of the
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* The Group of Eight, established in October 1975 to facilitate economic cooperation among the mem-
bers: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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experts believed that in the foreseeable future the Security Council would—
even where it has found, under Article 39 of the Charter, that a given situation
threatens international peace and security—authorize enforcement measures in
only about half the cases.
There were fifty-one member states when the UN was established in 1945; to-
day there are 192. Most of the experts believed that the number of states will in-
crease by 2020. They differed, however, in how high the number would go;
estimates ranged up to 225, the average being approximately 200. In a world that
increasingly operates on a one-nation/one-vote rule, U.S. influence would be di-
minished. The experts discussed the extent to which the international legal or-
der (global or regional) enhances or impedes the ability of the United States to
respond unilaterally as a primary actor. They also discussed whether the univer-
sality of global “rule sets” and institutions was hindered by their growth on the
regional level. Opinions on the latter question were mixed. Some saw the rela-
tionship between global and regional approaches as complementary; others be-
lieved they can come into conflict and that regional approaches can undermine
the unity of effort needed to solve global problems.
The experts widely believed that failing states will be a significant problem in
the coming years. One cited a study that provided a disturbing estimate: twenty
states that have already failed, twenty that are in danger of failing, and twenty
that are borderline. The total accounts for nearly one-third of the states in the
world. Failed states present a number of challenges. One challenge the experts
briefly considered was massive migrant/refugee flows.
Regional Developments
Opinions on regional issues were mixed. One expert opined that global prob-
lems require global solutions but that states often do not have the capacity to im-
plement those measures without regional cooperation. It is also clear that
UNCLOS, particularly Part XII on protection of the marine environment, calls
for global or regional solutions. One expert pointed out that regional rule sets
often fill actual gaps in the global rule set or provide alternatives better adapted
to a given regional identity (e.g., the Pacific Islands Forum states).* The group
seemed particularly moved by the warning of one expert that “regional” mea-
sures pertaining to enclosed and semi-enclosed seas—such as the Straits of
Singapore/Malacca, the Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean, Baltic, and Red
Seas—should be monitored closely. Those measures have the potential to im-
pact significantly on navigation rights.
A L L E N 7 7
* Formerly the South Pacific Forum, established 5 August 1971 to promote regional cooperation in
political matters between the sixteen members: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
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Several experts believed that as the national security stakes go up, if the Secu-
rity Council fails to take sufficient action on WMD proliferation, regional secu-
rity organizations or coalitions will feel compelled to act. Some experts
discussed the possibility of greater delegation by the Security Council to re-
gional organizations. The fact that at least one such organization, NATO, now
responds out of its area is a significant development. One expert suggested that
the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Rob-
bery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)* be closely watched. If ReCAAP succeeds
in improving the security conditions in the Malaccan Straits, the idea may catch
on. Regional arrangements may also extend their interest or protection to pipe-
lines and submarine communication cables on the seabed, which are vulnerable
to accidental or intentional damage or destruction.
Many of the experts expect more regional development in laws governing
fishing and environmental protection. One of the experts pointed out that, for
his nation, regional solutions are a necessity, not a luxury; regions must marshal
resources to meet some of their challenges. One expert thought there was a good
possibility that regional port-state control organizations (the United States par-
ticipates in several) will evolve beyond their present safety and environmental-
protection focus to take on maritime security. With their large vessel owner/
charterer databases and access to the Automatic Identification Systems, port-
state control organizations will be favorably positioned to conduct the analysis
necessary to detect anomalies.
Nonproliferation and Disarmament
One-third of the experts expressed a belief that if North Korea and Iran join In-
dia, Israel, and Pakistan as nuclear-weapons states, the already fragile Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty will collapse. One suggested that we could soon be fac-
ing a world of thirty nuclear-weapons states. The experts’ answers to certain re-
lated questions are revealing (figure 1).
A majority of experts were skeptical of the efficacy of Security Council–
ordered sanctions. Asked “What will be the likely effect of UNSCR 1718 sanc-
tions against North Korea?” they answered as shown in figure 2 (at this writing it
is still unclear what course North Korea will take). Interestingly, most experts
did not believe the United States should lead any maritime enforcement of sanc-
tions against North Korea. Seventy-five percent thought China should conduct
any necessary maritime interdiction operations, with Japan, South Korea, Aus-
tralia, Russia, and NATO also getting large support. Most thought that any such
operation should be multilateral; one suggested that a UN-based force would
7 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* Entered into force on 4 September 2006, with fourteen states ratifying to date: Bangladesh, Brunei
Darussalam, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Burma, the Philippines, Singapore,
Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
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have the greatest legitimacy. Whether future maritime enforcement actions
against North Korea would have to be reconciled with the existing UN cease-fire
agreement was not posed directly to the experts.
The nuclear nonproliferation challenge will almost certainly grow. A rapidly
growing demand for nuclear power applications, in response to oil scarcity and
carbon emission concerns, means there will be significantly more fissile material
in circulation, which could be diverted to nuclear or radiological devices. The
future challenge of preventing proliferation and safeguarding nuclear materials
while in storage or transit will be significant. The International Atomic Energy
Agency’s visibility will also grow.
The regime for missile technology (including cruise missiles and un-
manned aerial vehicles) is very weak, as the interdiction of the M/V So San—
which violated no laws transporting Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen—
demonstrated.* The fact that Iran provided Hezbollah with both unmanned
aerial vehicles and antiship cruise missiles demonstrates the urgency of the
mission and of the at-sea enforcement, missile-defense, and force-protection
challenges.
Jus ad Bellum: Law Governing Resort to Armed Force
We cannot accurately characterize the security threat environment of
2025; therefore we must organize and arrange our forces to create the
agility and flexibility to deal with unknowns and surprises in the com-
ing decades.
GENERAL PETER PACE, USMC, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
The law governing a state’s resort to armed force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of another state is governed by articles 2(4) and 51 of
the UN Charter. In the coming years, that law might not have the flexibility
needed to meet the threat environment described by General Pace in his Chair-
man’s Assessment of the 2006 Quadrennial Review, particularly with regard to
threats posed by transnational terrorist networks and WMD proliferators.
A L L E N 7 9
Do you believe that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will
survive if North Korea and Iran join India, Israel, and Pakistan
as non-NPT-compliant nuclear-weapons states?
Yes: 68%
No: 32%
How likely is it that the Security Council will impose sanctions
against Iran for violations of UNSCR 1696?
Likely: 53%
Unlikely: 47%
How likely is it that the Security Council will impose sanctions
against Iran for NPT violations that will require maritime
enforcement?
Likely: 47%
Unlikely: 53%
FIGURE 1
* For the So San incident, see, in the Naval War College Review, Craig H. Allen, “The Limits of Intelli-
gence in Maritime Counterproliferation Operations,” vol. 60, no. 1 (Winter 2007), pp. 42–43.
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A significant minority of the experts (43 percent) believed that the majority
of states do not accept that “anticipatory self-defense” is lawful under the UN
Charter, insisting that a state is justified in using armed force only after it has
been the victim of an armed attack. Of the experts holding that a majority of
states do accept the principle of anticipatory self-defense, 59 percent believed
that the principle was limited to situations meeting the test set out in the Caroline
case—that is, immediacy, proportionality, and necessity.* Some experts believed
that growing concerns over WMD proliferation will cause more states to soften
their stance against preemptive use of force, particularly as they come to appre-
ciate the consequences of the fact that nation-states have lost their historical
monopoly on the large-scale use of force. Absorbing an “armed attack” before
responding may be untenable if the attack is by WMD.
One expert cited two areas of concern in the jus ad bellum. The first is its treat-
ment of transborder responses by one state against another that is supporting ter-
rorists who attack across the border. The second area concerned responses to states
that harbor such terrorists. The expert who made that point warned that decisions
by the International Court of Justice on “self-defense”must be carefully monitored.
The experts cited some continuing gray areas in the law. For instance, is an at-
tack on a merchant vessel, submarine cable or pipeline, offshore platform, satel-
lite, unmanned vehicle, or computer network an “armed attack” justifying the
attacked state in using force to defend itself? One development to watch for is the
forthcoming definition of the crime of “aggression” by the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC). Most of the experts (78 percent) thought it was unlikely that
the majority of states will accept the argument that the “duty to protect” justifies
humanitarian intervention to halt gross human rights abuses in the absence of
an authorizing Security Council resolution. Given the number of potentially
failing states, this is sure to be more widely discussed.
Jus in Bello: Law of Armed Conflict
Some experts predicted that states and NGOs will increasingly argue that every-
thing in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions represents customary
international law and is therefore binding on all states whether they are party to
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Sanctions will have no effect on North Korea’s nuclear weapons or missile
programs but will result in further hardships to the North Korean people.
54%
Sanctions will persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and
missile programs, accept IAEA safeguards, and return to Six-Party Talks.
21%
Sanctions will simply force North Korea to be more covert about its
programs.
21%
FIGURE 2
* For a discussion of the legal principles established by the 1837 Caroline case see Yoram Dinstein,
War, Aggression and Self-Defense, 4th ed. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), pp. 184–85.
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the protocol or not (the United States is not). They warn that one of the inter-
national tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice or one of the inter-
national criminal tribunals, might hold to that effect in the near future. Some
also point out that the decision might not come from an international tribunal
but instead from U.S. federal legislation or the Supreme Court.
Several experts warned that the law of armed conflict might evolve in a way
that steadily narrows the use of force, by taking increasingly strict positions on
military necessity and proportionality. One expert opined that the law of armed
conflict is already a virtual arms control treaty. When asked if the 2006 conflict
between Israel and Hezbollah would lead to efforts to further restrict the rules
regarding proportionality (e.g., collateral damage or casualties), 40 percent
thought it would. There is already considerable debate within the American So-
ciety of International Law on this subject—most of it highly critical of Israel.
The experts saw the law of armed conflict as an area in which the U.S. Navy
can help shape the law, through participation in international negotiations and
conferences with relevant governmental and nongovernmental organizations. It
is also an area that may present more interoperability issues in the coming years,
as allies and coalition partner states come to the game with different law of
armed conflict rule sets and different rules of engagement.
Law of the Sea
The experts who spoke out all voiced strong support for U.S. accession to the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and frustration over the continued
delay in its doing so. (The convention’s system of seas, zones, airspace, etc., is
summarized in figure 3.) Some described experiences demonstrating that being
a nonparty is a source of considerable friction, if not a disability, in dealing with
other states on maritime issues. Most believed that the United States would in
fact accede to the convention either by 2010 (60 percent) or by 2015 (83 per-
cent). Significantly, President Bush formally announced on 15 May 2007 that he
was urging the Senate to act favorably on U.S. accession to the convention dur-
ing the current session of Congress.
A significant minority of the experts expressed concern about the stability of
navigation rights codified in the UNCLOS (see figure 4). In answer to a related
question on what they believed would have the most influence on the construc-
tion and application of UNCLOS in the next ten years, they ranked the influ-
ences as follows (beginning with the most influential): state practice; processes
in intergovernmental organizations other than the UN (e.g., International Mar-
itime Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization); decisions by interna-
tional tribunals; and the annual UN process (the Informal Consultative Process
on Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, and the General Assembly review).
A L L E N 8 1
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On the influence of state practice, several experts were very outspoken on the
need to pay particular attention to practice by the United States. The U.S. push
to extend its laws into coastal waters in the name of security or environmental
protection will, they argued, encourage other states to do the same, leading to an
erosion of navigation rights.
As one expert warned, one cannot focus on the innocent-transit passage re-
gimes through the territorial seas without also carefully watching what coastal
states (including the United States) are doing in their exclusive economic zones
(EEZs). As he put it, “If you can’t get through the EEZ, you will never get to the
international strait.” The experts further warned that navigation rights of war-
ships and military aircraft should not be the sole focus but that the navigational
and overflight rights of the merchant vessels and commercial aircraft so vital to
military logistics and to the vitality of international trade should also be
considered.
Maritime zones were briefly discussed (Israel having imposed a “blockade”
on Lebanon less than four months before the workshop). One expert warned of
the often-overlooked connection between navigation rights and freedoms and
jus ad bellum: If the doctrine of preemptive self-defense grows, could a state
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FIGURE 3
UNCLOS ZONES AND LIMITS
Will the innocent passage regime remain stable until 2020?
62% yes
38% no
Will the innocent transit regime through international straits remain
stable until 2020?
59% yes
41% no
Will the archipelagic sea lanes passage regime remain stable until 2020?
49% yes
51% no
FIGURE 4
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn 2007.vp
Thursday, September 13, 2007 3:41:23 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
bordering the Strait of Hormuz attempt to close it to all navigation in the name
of coastal-state “self-defense”?
The experts made one prediction that suggests a potential new partner in the
quest to protect freedom of navigation: 72 percent of the experts believed that in
the coming years China will regularly patrol waters more than a thousand miles
from the Chinese coast.
A majority of the experts believed that more marine protected areas will be
established between now and 2020. Management plans for these areas may in-
corporate a variety of navigation restrictions to protect vulnerable ecosystems,
perhaps including vessel reporting and movement systems, pilotage require-
ments, routing measures and areas to be avoided, and discharge restrictions that
exceed the standards of the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (or MARPOL, as modified in 1978). Fifty-one percent of
the participants believed that more than 10 percent of the oceans will be desig-
nated as maritime protected areas by 2020; 24 percent put the number at 34 per-
cent or more. Another source of concern to freedom of navigation will be
boundary-delimitation disputes over offshore areas (particularly those with oil
and gas) as states attempt to exclude foreign vessels from disputed waters.
One expert with extensive personal knowledge and experience on the subject
pointed out that the executive branch of the U.S. government is poorly orga-
nized for making balanced ocean-policy decisions. The National Security Council–
led Policy Coordinating Committee, Oceans Sub-Policy Coordinating Commit-
tee, on which the Navy serves, seldom meets. As a result, the Committee on
Ocean Policy (led by the Council on Environmental Quality) dominates the
ocean policy agenda, and in a way that favors environmental protection over
freedom of navigation.
The experts were cautious regarding the legal status of sea-basing vessels and
unmanned vehicles, some expressing the belief that their status has not been au-
thoritatively determined. One urged that the U.S. Navy should not assume that
other states will accept its position without question. Another argued that sea
basing must be distinguished from “navigation.” Unmanned vehicles will not
necessarily be accorded the same navigation and overflight rights as manned
craft, particularly as armed unmanned vehicles become more common, and at
least one expert considered the case for claiming sovereign immunity for them
weak.
Ninety-five percent of the experts predicted that in the coming years more
states will claim the legal right to exercise jurisdiction and control over military
activities in and over their EEZs. At the same time, 92 percent believed that more
Mediterranean states will assert EEZ claims; presently, only Egypt and Cyprus
have made full EEZ claims.
A L L E N 8 3
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The discussion made it clear that the answers of some of the experts regarding
coastal-state control over military activities included intelligence and hydro-
graphic collection activities. One expert pointed out that China takes the posi-
tion that all such collection activities fall within the UNCLOS provisions for
marine scientific research and would therefore require coastal-state consent be-
fore they could be carried out in the two-hundred-nautical-mile EEZ.
Environmental Laws Applicable to Military Operations
The experts predicted that restrictive environmental regulations will increase
both in the United States and overseas. Those regulations would extend to vessel
and aircraft discharges, including air and sound emissions (i.e., sonar). The reg-
ulations would take several forms, including conditions on basing and port and
landing restrictions, and some would increasingly extend the coastal zone out to
two hundred nautical miles. As mentioned earlier, the experts also foresaw an
increase in the portion of the seas that will fall within marine protected areas of
various kinds. Canadian claims over Arctic waters will take on added impor-
tance if future ice conditions in those seas open a northern interocean route to
ordinary surface vessels. One expert warned that the immunity or exemption for
warships and other public vessels from applicable coastal-state environmental
laws may be eroding. Moreover, an increasing number of laws hold commanders
personally liable for violations by their vessels or aircraft.
One expert warned that the G-77* states, a body that operated so effectively
during UNCLOS III, is once again driving the Law of the Sea environmental
agenda within the annual Informal Consultative Process on Ocean Affairs and
Law of the Sea. Navigation rights are not of great concern to G-77 states. The ex-
perts urged the U.S. Navy to join the Department of State in fully engaging in the
Consultative Process or it might find its interests underrepresented. The same is
true at the International Maritime Organization, where the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency
might push for a position inimical to Navy and merchant-marine mobility in-
terests. One expert noted that shipping NGOs (e.g., the Baltic and International
Maritime Council and the International Chamber of Shipping) are engaged in
the same issues.
Some experts were worried that environmental regulations applicable out to
two hundred nautical miles—both in the United States and overseas (especially
the EU and Australia)—would open the way to what one called the
“territorialization” of the exclusive economic zone, by which he meant that the
EEZ regime would be as pervasive and restrictive of operations as the territorial
8 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* The Group of Seventy-seven, so called for its original membership, now includes 130 states and the
Palestine Liberation Organization. It was established 15 June 1964 to promote economic coopera-
tion among developing countries.
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sea regime. The experts cautioned the Navy to pay careful attention to domestic
legislation, both federal and state, because such regulations may prove to be the
first and worst to encroach upon freedom of navigation. One expert pointed out
that UNCLOS, because the United States is not party to it, is not a treaty under
Article VI of the Constitution and that therefore some courts will be reluctant to
hold that the international law of the sea preempts conflicting state laws.
Four potential consequences of the increasing scope of environmental regula-
tions were identified. First, they will make it harder to conduct combined opera-
tions, thereby limiting the U.S. Navy’s ability to overcome interoperability problems
(the RIMPAC ’06 sonar litigation is a case in point). Second, they will make it more
difficult to obtain overseas bases or to enter foreign ports or land at foreign airports.
Third, they will expose commanders and their subordinates to enforcement actions
by foreign governments. Finally, they will make weapons training more difficult.
Although the United States can offset some loss of live training with “synthetic”
training, that technology is not available to most other nations.
Accountability of Military and Civilian Personnel
The experts most familiar with accountability issues saw little or nothing in that
realm favorable for the U.S. military in the future. The expectation is that more
conduct will be criminalized and that more states will seek to prosecute Ameri-
can service members and civilians. It is to be expected that some status-of-forces
agreements and visiting-forces agreements will have be renegotiated to give host
states more extensive jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. Article 98* agreements
will be harder to come by. More states may claim universal jurisdiction over cer-
tain offenses (particularly those within the jurisdiction of the ICC), and more
states may adopt laws equivalent to the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act. Some states
may be expected in the not-too-distant future to refer a U.S. service member to
the ICC. The chilling effect this would have on officials, commanders, and ordi-
nary service members must be considered.
Allies and partner nations may find their freedom of action further limited by
regional legislation or judicial decisions (e.g., the European Court of Human
Rights), making it harder to attract coalition partners and increasing legal
interoperability challenges. In the near future we may well see rulings from inter-
national, regional, and national courts that will send a chill through commanders
and their subordinates. We should also expect to see more “commander liability”
laws imposing personal liability for environmental violations. As a result, com-
manders might increasingly feel compelled to take out professional liability insur-
ance and to keep criminal defense attorneys on retainer.
A L L E N 8 5
* That is, agreements negotiated under Article 98 of the Rome Statute protecting U.S. nationals from
surrender for prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC).
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Law Enforcement/International Criminal Law
When asked what they thought the greatest threat was to the sea lines of commu-
nication (the conversation included international straits), 47 percent answered
criminal activities or terrorism. Piracy was listed by only 5 percent of the experts.
The majority (69 percent) of the experts did not believe that the international
criminal law regime will evolve sufficiently between now and 2020 to effectively
address transnational terrorism, WMD proliferation networks, maritime traffick-
ing (in narcotics, weapons, and humans), or piracy, in the absence of significant
military assistance. However, some did believe that by 2020 terrorism and traffick-
ing in narcotics or humans could become crimes of universal jurisdiction or
grounds for an expanded right of approach under Article 110 of UNCLOS.
One expert pointed out that many of the missions listed under “maritime secu-
rity operations” in the Navy Operational Concept require law enforcement authority
and that at present the only authorization the Navy has from Congress is for piracy
and counterdrug enforcement. Perhaps (the question is unclear) the Navy should
reconsider its stance on the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) and the related Department
of Defense directives. One expert reported significant and unresolved tensions with
the PCA in the U.S. Northern Command area of responsibility.
The experts were also asked to express their opinion on future trends in en-
forcing laws in the maritime domain. When asked what proportion of flag states
would be willing and able to exercise effectively their jurisdiction and control
over their ships outside their own waters, none thought that 80 percent would be
able to do so; the majority (71 percent of the experts) thought that only 40 per-
cent or less of the flag states would. As to which states would likely see their roles
in maritime law enforcement grow the most, 61 percent of the experts believed it
would be coastal states, followed by the “willing and able states” (19 percent,
some citing NATO and Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI] states), port states
(16 percent), and flag states (2 percent).
Several experts raised questions regarding the use of force in law enforcement op-
erations. Some wondered whether any use of force, even warning shots or disabling
fire, raises issues under the UN Charter. Others believe that force used by a vessel
engaged in law enforcement against a nongovernment vessel to compel compliance
(to stop or board) raises questions regarding probable cause, reasonableness, and
the necessity to compel compliance but not Article 2(4) use-of-force questions. The is-
sue is squarely presented by UNSCR 1718, which authorizes “inspections” but cites
Article 41 for its authority, implying that no armed force can be used.*
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* Article 41: “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations.”
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Intelligence/Information
The experts identified a number of links between intelligence and the law of the
sea. There was concern that more states may assert the position that no intelli-
gence collection can take place in or over a state’s two-hundred-nautical-mile
EEZ unless prior consent is obtained from, and all information obtained is
shared with, the coastal state. Disputes over laws governing intelligence and hydro-
graphic collection activities by air (e.g., the April 2001 EP-3 dispute with China)
and sea (China’s March 2001 protests concerning USNS Nathaniel Bowditch) in
a coastal state’s EEZ are a potential flashpoint, particularly with China and
North Korea.
The experts believed that the breadth and depth of persistent intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and other collection sources—including many
open sources, like Google Earth and Digital Global—together with the growing
and increasingly networked databases, will vastly increase our maritime domain
awareness, as well as that of adversaries. At the same time, the U.S. Navy will it-
self grow increasingly transparent, eliminating its potential for achieving sur-
prise and increasing its force-protection challenge. Nevertheless, the difficulty
of sifting through a global merchant fleet that now numbers over six hundred
thousand vessels (as the UN Conference on Trade and Development reported in
2006), 270,000 of which are registered in “flag of convenience” states, to detect
anomalies will be daunting.
Legal issues in intelligence and information sharing will also present a grow-
ing challenge in the coming years. More laws in the United States and EU that
make it more difficult to share information are to be expected, as well increased
hostility in Congress to some collection methods. Moreover, federal courts can-
not be expected to continue to shield intelligence broadly from disclosure under
the Classified Information Procedures Act.
Migrants/Refugees
The United States is certainly not alone in its struggle to stem the flow of illegal
migration. Australia and the Mediterranean states also have serious problems.
The experts discussed several scenarios that could trigger massive migrant or
refugee flows. As mentioned above, 73 percent of the experts were of the opinion
that the present legal regime on refugees is inadequate to handle such large
movements.
CONSEQUENCES FOR MARITIME SECURITY MISSIONS
Linear analysis will get you a much-changed caterpillar, but it won’t get
you a butterfly. For that you need a leap in imagination.
ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
A L L E N 8 7
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After examining changes in the global legal order, the experts turned to a discus-
sion of the likely effects those changes might have on maritime security mis-
sions. They were first given a list of twenty-two missions listed in the current
Navy Operational Concept and asked which would likely no longer be necessary
in 2020. Only two of the twenty-two missions received many votes for elimina-
tion: pollution response (52 percent of the experts) and marine resource protec-
tion (33 percent). Surprisingly, 11 percent thought deterrence and maritime law
enforcement could be eliminated by 2020, and 5 percent said the same about sea
control and Security Council sanctions enforcement.
Defense Missions
Few of the experts forecasted significant change to the national defense missions
of the Navy, other than the earlier suggestion by 11 percent that deterrence
would no longer be necessary (it is unclear whether these answers referred only
to strategic deterrence). Some appear to suggest that counterterrorism and
counterproliferation will be of such a scale as to present a greater demand for a
national defense response. This will almost certainly be the case if (when?) an-
other 9/11-scale attack or a WMD attack occurs. One discussion focused on bal-
listic missile defense; however, the experts were not polled on the matter. Several
experts offered extended comments on potential growth in enforcement mea-
sures ordered by the Security Council (a MOOTW mission, about which more is
said below). Those views focused on sanctions enforcement against North Korea
or Iran and on the likelihood that failed states would create threats to inter-
national peace and security requiring intervention. Enforcement actions against
North Korea or Iran would carry a significant risk of escalation. It was also noted
that North Korea presents two significant threat potentials: escalation during
counterproliferation/Security Council enforcement operations and the kind of
collapse that could trigger a massive refugee flow.
Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW)
Most of the comments regarding the global legal order changes that are likely to
affect naval missions fell within the MOOTW rubric. Some saw an increasing de-
mand for counterproliferation, counterterrorism, maritime intercept operations,
maritime law enforcement, humanitarian relief, and freedom of navigation oper-
ations. Several predicted that maritime law enforcement will become the domi-
nant naval mission in the future. A majority of the experts expected an upturn,
perhaps a sharp upturn, in the demand for maritime interception operations, par-
ticularly those conducted under a Security Council resolution, or outside such a
resolution, to interdict WMD or delivery systems. They were less sure about the le-
gitimacy and viability of an interception scheme if the underlying legal regime
collapses. For example, if the Non-Proliferation Treaty were to collapse after
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reaching a tipping point of renunciations, the underlying legal prohibition on the
transfer of fissile materials or nuclear technology would disappear.
Some experts expected that concern over proliferation would lead a large
number of states to ratify the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention.* The proto-
col’s amendments to Article 3 will extend the prohibitions on the transfer or
transport of WMD, while amendments to Article 8 will provide new authority
for boardings by states other than flag states. When the protocol enters into
force, demand for interdiction operations may rise appreciably; however, it is
doubtful that the U.S. Navy or Marine Corps will have authority under Ameri-
can domestic law to take enforcement action under it. Accordingly, any mari-
time enforcement by the United States would be carried out by the Coast Guard.
Several events could trigger a need for a rapid surge response, including a
pandemic, natural disaster, or a collapsed state that triggers a massive refugee
flow. Planners should understand, it was suggested, that the global legal regime
for such crises is grossly inadequate. With up to sixty states failed, failing, or on
the borderline, there will be a continuing need for naval evacuation operations
and for an offshore stabilizing presence.
Means and Methods
The experts predicted that future Navy maritime operations will be more joint
(85 percent), more combined (94 percent), and more interagency (88 percent).
One warned that the transition to interagency operations under the “lead fed-
eral agency,” “supported-supporting agency” approach will present much more
of a challenge than will the transition to joint operations. The majority did not
believe that future operations will more often be coordinated with or directed by
the UN (68 percent) or with NGOs (62 percent). Friction due to legal
interoperability issues and pressure on foreign navies to avoid operations with
the navies of states that do not subscribe to their full rule set (UNCLOS, Geneva
Protocol I, etc.) may make it increasingly difficult to form coalitions. When
asked what factors they believed would be most influential in persuading other
states to join a global maritime partnership (formerly referred to as the “thousand-
ship navy”), they answered: shared interest (79 percent), economic incentives (8
percent), threat concerns, gaining access to information held by partners (2 per-
cent), and a pledge to promote and abide by the rule of law (2 percent).
“THE RULE OF LAW AT SEA IS NOT SELF-EXECUTING”
The legal experts’ workshop began the U.S. Navy’s “conversation with the coun-
try,” indeed, with the world—a conversation that is an integral part of the
A L L E N 8 9
* Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
adopted 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992. The 2005 Protocol to this convention has
not yet entered into force.
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maritime strategy development process. The experts are to be commended for
their seriousness of purpose and their willingness to share their views on this vi-
tal matter. Plainly, they have demonstrated the wisdom of groups.
The geostrategic environment has been described as one characterized by
rapid change. Although that is certainly true in some of the dimensions covered,
such as technology, it is less true of the legal regime. Because the law tends to
evolve relatively slowly, it can serve as a stabilizing force to promote public order.
That said, however, it is clear that the experts believe that the global legal order
will in fact evolve between now and 2020 and that those changes will alter the
context in which the new maritime strategy operates. A number of experts
forcefully stated that it would be a mistake for the U.S. Navy or the maritime
strategy to portray international law only as a restriction on freedom of action.
They clearly saw international law as an “enabler” as well.
There is an appreciable risk of an erosion of navigation and overflight rights in
coastal waters and of high-seas freedoms in the coming years. The potential insta-
bility of the 1982 UNCLOS regime is exacerbated by the failure of the United States
to accede to the convention. “Shaping” activities by the United States and
like-minded nations (perhaps including China in the not-too-distant future)—
through strategic communications and diligent, consistent diplomacy that focuses
on shared interests and continued freedom-of-navigation exercises—will be indis-
pensable to protecting existing freedoms. For the United States, the task begins at
home, where overreaching legislation and presidential proclamations to enhance
coastal security or environmental protection provide a template for other states.
The military profession will be increasingly challenged by the likely changes
in the law of armed conflict and expanding personal-responsibility doctrines.
The challenge may include an expansion of criminal prohibitions, assertions of
jurisdiction by more states, or refusals to adhere to restrictions in existing status-
of-forces/visiting-forces agreements on host-nation jurisdiction. The potential
for a chilling effect on the willingness of members of the national security pro-
fession to take action or even travel abroad bears careful watching.
The U.S. Navy should expand its participation in global and regional fora
with responsibility for the development of domestic and international law relat-
ing to the law of the sea (including provisions applicable to merchant vessels and
military and commercial aircraft). It should pay, the experts felt, particular
attention to the UN annual process on ocean affairs and the law of the sea, the
International Maritime Organization and International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation, and, within the United States, the oceans policy working groups.
All of the experts agreed that the new maritime strategy should affirm the place
of international law in maritime security. As one expert put it, international law “is
the foundation on which we operate; it is why we are there and it defines the
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parameters of everything we do.”Respect for international law does not mean aban-
doning rights protected by UNCLOS or acquiescence in attempts by other states or
NGOs to further restrict rules governing the use of armed force. As one expert
pointed out, to achieve the objectives established by higher-level strategy docu-
ments, this nation must employ diplomatic and information measures to “shape”
international law. Accordingly, the new maritime strategy should:
• Acknowledge the central role of international law in protecting the balance of
state interests in the oceans. Embrace the law of the sea as both a long-standing
guarantor of the right to use the seas, as well as a set of carefully calibrated
restraints on the exercise of those rights, to guard against abuses.
• Emphasize that freedom of navigation and overflight is not merely a U.S.
interest, but a global interest, and that we must act cooperatively to protect
those freedoms for merchant vessels and civil aircraft as well as warships
and military aircraft.
• Acknowledge that the rule of law at sea is not self-executing. Without
effective enforcement measures, compliance levels may not be adequate to
meet the need for public order on the seas. Although international law
assigns primary enforcement responsibility to the vessels’ flag states, we
must recognize that not all flag states are willing or able to fully comply
with their international obligations. The same can be said for a number of
port states and coastal states. The common interest in maritime domain
security urgently requires all states to take joint action to close these gaps.
• Pledge to redouble Navy efforts— in close partnership with the
Departments of State, Justice, Commerce and Homeland Security—to
encourage the new Senate to provide its advice and consent to U.S.
accession to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
MODERATOR ’ S NOTE
This report is based on the Web-IQ answers
and written and oral remarks of the partici-
pants. The experts were not asked to approve
it, and it does not necessarily represent the
individual views of any given expert or of the
Naval War College. The workshop “record”
consists of: graphics produced on the second
day recording the experts’ oral suggestions of
the first day; moderator’s notes taken on the
second day; forty-seven pages of Web-IQ
summarized answers; and the handwritten
submissions of twenty-five experts on a
handout prepared and circulated on the sec-
ond day. The chairman/moderator culled
from that record those opinions most rele-
vant to the maritime strategy development
project. The moderator prepared a separate
summary of suggestions regarding issues the
experts felt deserved closer examination in a
dedicated legal conference. The Peter Schwartz
epigraph is from his Inevitable Surprises:
Thinking Ahead in Time of Turbulence (New
York: Free Press, 2004).
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